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Credit Bidding: Expanding the “For Cause”
Exception Under Section 363(k) of the
Bankruptcy Code
Austin Harms*
As auctions have become more prominent in Chapter 11 proceedings,
credit bidding has bolstered the multi-decade trend of secured creditor
dominance, which the Supreme Court sustained in 2012. Since this 2012
decision, bankruptcy courts have attempted to level the playing field by
progressively expanding the interpretation of Section 363(k) of the
Bankruptcy Code, which permits courts to limit secured creditors’ ability to
credit bid “for cause.” The conflict between the Supreme Court’s 2012
decision and the bankruptcy courts’ recent interpretation of Section 363(k)
created an uncertainty that currently plagues the market for secured claims
of distressed companies. This Note reviews the current state of the law
surrounding credit bidding, examines the most recent developments likely
to impact its future, and provides interpretive recommendations for
bankruptcy practitioners and the judiciary.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many modern Chapter 11 cases now center on realizing a sale of a
substantial portion of the debtor’s business. As a result, it is no surprise
that secured creditors’ rights to credit bid in sales of their collateral under
the Bankruptcy Code have become such important points of contention.
Credit bidding involves a secured creditor bidding for its collateral in a
bankruptcy auction using outstanding debt obligations as currency. This
Note reviews the current landscape of the law surrounding credit bidding,
canvases the developments likely to be seen in the near future, and
proposes a palatable interpretive solution for the judiciary.

* J.D. Candidate, UC Hastings College of the Law; B.A., Government, Harvard University. Thank
you first to Jared Ellias for his inspiration and invaluable guidance throughout the writing process and
beyond; to the Editorial Board of the Hastings Business Law Journal for their hard work; and to my
friends and family for their unwavering support.
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Although the Chapter 11 process is frequently referred to as a system
of reorganization,1 many of the largest Chapter 11 cases in recent history
cannot properly be labeled as such. In fact, nearly fifty-six percent of these
debtors engage in a sale of substantially all of those assets.2 Many of the
largest bankruptcies of the twentieth century were of railroad companies
whose largest assets were railroad tracks, which were too valuable
collectively to be sold piecemeal and too expensive for any one buyer to
purchase alone.3 Today, even in cases of extremely leveraged capital
structures, funding resources such as lending syndicates enable arm’s
length buyers to purchase entire firms.
As a result of this paradigmatic shift toward asset sales, modern
bankruptcy judges often serve as auctioneers in many high-stakes cases.
This evolution of duties begs the question of how bankruptcy judges should
structure the auctions over which they preside. In deciding this matter,
judges must keep in mind bankruptcy policy of maximizing recoveries to
the debtor’s claimants.4
From its enactment in 1978 until a circuit split began on September
29, 2009, it was understood that the Bankruptcy Code absolutely protected
secured creditors’ right to credit bid at a debtor’s sale of their collateral.
Within this scheme, most bankruptcy sales took place under section 363(b)
of the Bankruptcy Code, which dictates that a court can only deny secured
creditors their right to credit bid under the seldom utilized section 363(k)
“for cause” exception.5 In cases where the sale was to occur pursuant to
the confirmation plan, section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) required courts to preserve
secured creditors’ right to credit bid. Until early 2014, the value associated
with credit bidding was certain, as the bankruptcy courts rarely utilized
section 363(k) and thus had little authority to limit the practice.6
Then, in early 2014, Judge Kevin Gross decided In re Fisker
Automotive Holdings, Inc.,7 in which he used section 363(k) to limit the
right of secured creditors to credit bid in an auction of their collateral.
1. See Nevin M. Gewertz, Comment, Act or Asset? Multiplicitous Indictments Under the
Bankruptcy Fraud Statute, 18 USC § 152, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 909, 929 (2009).
2. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Reply, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV.
673, 675–76 (2003) (finding that of Chapter 11 proceedings concluded in 2002, fifty-six percent of
them involved sales of assets).
3. Id. at 699.
4. See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163 (1991) (affirming the “general Code policy of
maximizing value of the bankruptcy estate”).
5. DONALD S. BERNSTEIN ET AL., The Logic and Limits of Credit Bidding by Secured Creditors
Under the Bankruptcy Code, in LAWRENCE P. KING AND CHARLES SELIGSON WORKSHOP ON
BANKRUPTCY AND BUSINESS REORGANIZATION 2011, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1975932.
6. See In re 222 Liberty Ass’n., 108 B.R. 971, 978 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) (noting that the
Bankruptcy Code contemplates that the creditor is protected up to the full amount of its claim through
its right to credit bid at the sale of the property).
7. See In re Fisker Auto. Holdings, Inc., 510 B.R. 55 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014).
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Later in 2014, In re Free Lance-Star Publishing Company8 was decided,
which utilized the same “for cause” provision as Fisker to limit a secured
creditor’s right to credit bid in a similar auction of its collateral.9 These
decisions ignited the restructuring community, with some observers
arguing that Fisker and Free Lance-Star redefined the “for cause” standard
under which the right to credit bid may be constrained.10 Supporters of this
position assert that the secured creditors’ conduct in Fisker and Free
Lance-Star, which was deemed improper by the courts, was not uncommon
practice for creditors in similar contexts. In contrast, those arguing for
restrictions on credit bidding cite secured creditors’ unfair advantage over
cash bidders, which chills bidding procedures, constrains the price
attainable by the debtor, and reduces the value of the estate. Still others
argue that the facts of Fisker and Free Lance-Star were unusually offensive
and these bankruptcy judges simply applied a long-established rule to
unfavorable facts.11 Considering the large amount of recent activity in the
credit bidding arena, some observers contend that the Supreme Court will
soon grant certiorari in another credit bidding case.12
To help explain the controversy surrounding these decisions and to
provide direction as to the future use of the section 363(k) “for cause”
exception, this Note first explores security interests and their role in
bankruptcy. Then, it reviews relevant case law and examines the Fisker,
Free Lance-Star, RML, and Charles Street decisions. Finally, it analyzes
the arguments surrounding the section 363(k) “for cause” exception and
proposes a reasoned interpretation.
II. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN BANKRUPTCY
Security interests are the backbone of many corporate loan
transactions. They allow a creditor to extend credit to a debtor while
protecting his investment. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC”) governs security interests in personal property, while statutory
law and case law govern security interests in real property. Under Article
9, a security interest is “an interest in personal property or fixtures, which
secures payment or performance of an obligation.”13 To install a security

8. In re Free Lance-Star Publishing Co., 512 B.R. 798, 804-05 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2014).
9. Id. at 801.
10. David Griffiths, Bankruptcy and Restructuring Annual Review, WEIL BANKR. BLOG (Dec. 22,
2014, 10:00 AM), http://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/case-overviews/2014-bankruptcy-andrestructuring-annual-review-2/print/.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. U.C.C. § 1-201(35) (2015).
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interest in real property, a slight majority of states utilize a deed of trust
while the rest utilize the mortgage.
Under Article 9 of the UCC, creditors may attempt to enforce their
security interests after default using three primary methods: (i) collection
and enforcement of the debt through a judicial process,14 (ii) repossession
and sale of the collateral without intervention of a court,15 and (iii)
acceptance of the collateral as full or partial satisfaction of the debt.16 Each
of these methods provides the creditor with a means by which to obtain
possession of the collateral.
In a typical securitized loan transaction, the debtor will grant the
creditor a security interest in one or more assets through a security
agreement. This agreement effectuates the debtor’s ownership interest in
the collateral in exchange for the security holder’s obligation to pay the
agreed upon value to the debtor.
Security interests are primarily used in loan transactions to secure the
payment of a debt. They provide the secured creditor with certain
preferential rights in any disposition of collateral by the debtor.17 These
rights vary among different secured interests, but most often if the debtor
defaults on a payment, the secured creditor is vested with a right to seize
and liquidate the property in order to receive the proceeds of the parties’
agreement. Secured creditors’ ability to collect proceeds from the sale of
their collateral in order to fulfill an outstanding obligation underpins the
rationale of credit bidding.
A security interest, once attached, is immediately enforceable against
the collateral. Attachment of personal property requires three things: (i)
that the debtor have rights in the collateral or the power to convey such
rights; (ii) that value be given; and, (iii) in most cases, that the debtor have
agreed to a security agreement that sufficiently describes the collateral.18
The statutory law and case law of individual jurisdictions govern

14. U.C.C. § 9-601 (2015) (“After default, a secured party . . . may reduce a claim to judgment,
foreclose, or otherwise enforce the claim, security interest, or agricultural lien by any available judicial
procedure.”).
15. U.C.C. § 9-609(a), (b) (2015) (“After default, a secured party . . . may take possession of the
collateral” either “pursuant to judicial process . . . [or] without judicial process, if it proceeds without
breach of the peace.”); U.C.C. § 9-610(a) (2015) (“After default, a secured party may sell, lease,
license, or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its present condition or following any
commercially reasonable preparation or processing.”); U.C.C. § 9-610(b) (2015) (“Every aspect of a
disposition of collateral, including the method, manner, time, place, and other terms, must be
commercially reasonable.”).
16. U.C.C. § 9-620 (2015) (providing that if the debtor consents and other conditions are met, “a
secured party may accept collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures”).
17. U.C.C. § 9-315(a) (2015).
18. See U.C.C. § 9-203 (2015).
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attachment of real property. However, attachment alone does not ensure
that the secured party’s interest will trump that of other lienholders.
Creditors take security interests in collateral to enforce their rights in
that collateral in the event the debtor defaults on their obligation. A
security interest enables the creditor to take possession of the collateral to
satisfy the underlying obligation. This enables the creditor to liquidate the
collateral or repurpose it in a profitable manner. If the proceeds from a sale
of the collateral exceed the amount of the underlying obligation, the debtor
is entitled to the excess. However, if the proceeds do not satisfy the entire
obligation, the creditor receives an unsecured deficiency judgment on
which he may act in bankruptcy proceedings. In this way, security interests
protect creditors from downside in lending.
Proponents of security interests argue that they lower the risk for the
lender and the lender in turn passes those savings on to the borrower,
thereby lowering its cost of capital. Detractors contend that secured
creditors can hold up reorganization of companies in financial distress.
The creditors’ incentives, they argue, often are to foreclose early on the
collateral, repossessing key assets and forcing the company into
bankruptcy.19
The most cited criticism of secured lending, however, is that if
secured creditors are permitted to foreclose on key company assets, the
debtor loses the ability to sell the business as a going concern and may be
forced to liquidate the business for a lesser price. This is inconsistent with
the overarching bankruptcy policy of maximizing the value of the estate.
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code resolves this potential for hold up by
restricting creditors’ rights to enforce their security interests.
III. CREDIT BIDDING: OVERVIEW, HISTORY, AND POLICY
A. CREDIT BIDDING OVERVIEW
True to its name, credit bidding involves a secured creditor bidding for
its collateral in a bankruptcy auction. In this situation, the debtor owes the
creditor a specified sum of money under an obligation and the creditor
seeks to extinguish that debt by bidding on its collateral.20 Normally,
secured creditors are not entitled to recover more in bankruptcy than the
amount of their allowed claim. So, by making a credit bid, a secured
19. SING. INSOLVENCY LAW REVIEW COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT (2013), https://www.mlaw.gov.s
g/content/dam/minlaw/corp/News/Revised%20Report%20of%20the%20Insolvency%20Law%20Reviw
%20Committee.pdf.
20. Vincent S. J. Buccola & Ashley C. Keller, Credit Bidding and the Design of Bankruptcy
Auctions, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99, 102 (2010).
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creditor can protect himself “in situations where [his] collateral is proposed
to be sold at a price that the secured creditor believes to be inadequate or
below market, whether because of the expedited timing of the sale, an
inadequate marketing process, or other factors.”21 For example, suppose
that Company B, a creditor of Company A, holds a security interest in
substantially all of Company A’s assets. Suppose further that Company
B’s outstanding obligation totals $5 million and that Company B expects its
collateral to sell for $3 million in a bankruptcy auction. If Company B
values the collateral at $4.5 million, it can credit bid up to $5 million in a
bankruptcy auction in order to protect itself from a depressed sale price of
its collateral.
Most often, the secured creditor is permitted to credit bid up to the full
amount of his secured claim as consideration for the debtor’s obligation.
This process allows secured creditors to compete with cash bids from third
parties. If no other adequate offers are made, secured creditors receive
possession of their collateral in lieu of the proceeds of a sale.22
B. POLICIES BEHIND CREDIT BIDDING
Credit bidding is a favored tool for maximizing the value of a
bankruptcy estate for three primary reasons. First, credit bidding increases
the frequently small pool of bidders that are familiar enough with the
debtor’s assets to purchase them on a condensed timetable.23 Financial,
business, and legal due diligence require considerable effort and monetary
expenditure that third parties often decide is insurmountable in light of the
potential credit bid. Secured creditors’ familiarity with the debtor’s assets
preempts the need for such extensive due diligence, enabling them to
participate in the auction on a condensed timetable.
Second, credit bidding reduces debtors’ incentives to favor “white
knight”24 buyers who may not pay the highest price for the assets.25 White
knights may, for example, promise to use the debtor’s assets for the benefit
of the debtor’s own management at the cost of the shareholders.26 This
situation gives rise to a typical agency problem: shareholders want to use
the assets in a manner that yields the highest value whereas the debtor’s
management want to ensure their personal compensation and longevity.
21. See Beal Bank, S.S.B. v. Waters Edge Ltd. Partnership, 248 B.R. 668, 679 (D. Mass. 2000)
(quoting 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1129.05[2][b], at 1129–34 (15th ed. rev. 1998)).
22. See U.C.C. § 9-601 (2015).
23. Buccola & Keller, supra note 20, at 100.
24. “White Knight” buyers are those that acquire a company, typically in financial distress or
undergoing a hostile takeover, on terms favorable to the company or its management.
25. Buccola & Keller, supra note 20, at 100.
26. Id. at 106.
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Sales within bankruptcy pose an especially difficult conundrum because the
liquidation of assets, which may maximize the value of the debtor’s estate,
necessarily spells out unemployment for the management.27 Credit bidding
solves this problem by enabling secured creditors to compete with white
knights’ cash bids, thus bringing more competitive bids to the auction and
reducing the debtor’s incentive to favor white knight bidders.
Third, credit bidding avoids unnecessary transaction costs associated
with preparing and financing a cash bid.28 It also eliminates liquidity
constraints that might otherwise prevent the secured creditor from bidding
and inhibit him from establishing an upset price.29 In theory, a secured
creditor should be able to purchase its collateral entirely with a credit bid if
it values the collateral at the same amount or less than the secured claim.
This is logically sound because the creditor’s security interest in the
debtor’s collateral assures either that the debtor will pay the full amount of
its obligation or the creditor may foreclose on the collateral and retain the
proceeds of a sale up to the full amount of his claim.30
The benefits of credit bidding extend beyond protecting secured
creditors to providing value to the debtor’s estate. Bankruptcy policy seeks
to maximize the value of the collateral so as to reduce the deficiency claims
against the estate and ultimately maximize the value of the estate. Credit
bidding works to this end by enlarging the usually small pool of realistic
bidders at the auction, which often leads to higher and more competitive
bids, eliminating the debtor management’s incentive to favor white knight
buyers who may not offer the highest and best price, and reducing
transaction costs associated with submitting a bid.
Although the Bankruptcy Code sometimes precludes creditors from
exerting some of their property rights,31 it does not actually inhibit the
creditors’ ownership of the property.32 Credit bidding can therefore be
viewed as a rational acknowledgment of creditors’ property interests. The
ability to credit bid up to the face value of his claim in a bankruptcy sale
ensures that a secured creditor will not “pay himself cash for his own
property.”33

27. Buccola & Keller, supra note 20, at 106.
28. Id. at 100.
29. BERNSTEIN, supra note 5.
30. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 331 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting).
31. For instance, the automatic stay prevents the creditor from repossessing his collateral. See 11
U.S.C. § 362 (2010).
32. See Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, A Secured Creditor’s Rights to Intellectual
Property Licensed by a Debtor in Bankruptcy, 20-MAY AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 24 (May, 2001)
(stating that a security interest is equal to a property interest and the termination of an automatic stay
does not eradicate this property interest).
33. Buccola & Keller, supra note 20, at 102.
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In practice, credit bidding allows secured creditors to bid the value of
the debtor’s outstanding obligation plus any residual amount in cash.
Proponents of credit bidding contend that “all of a debtor’s claimants, in all
states of the world, should be indifferent among receiving their share of the
sale proceeds from an outside bidder, from the creditor class as a whole, or
from the credit bidding [creditor].”34
Credit bidding provides an
opportunity for the secured creditor to realize what it believes to be the full
value of the collateral it bargained for, insulates the secured creditor from
being forced to cash out when the value of the debtor’s assets are
depressed, and protects the secured creditor from the risk of “bankruptcy
discount.”35
However, arguments stand to suggest that credit bidding detracts from
the goal of maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate. These critics,
often junior creditors, argue that secured creditors’ ability to overbid with
currency (the creditors’ deficiency claims) “chills” bidding by noncreditor
third parties.36 The idea is that secured creditors’ bids deter third parties,
who have to incur transaction costs conducting financial, business, and
legal diligence and raising cash bids, from making competitive offers. This
is especially true if there is a question as to whether the assets are worth the
face amount of the secured debt, which is frequently the case with
distressed companies. As a result, fewer potential buyers participate in the
bankruptcy auction, often times yielding a lower purchase price and
depressed estate values.
Fundamentally, permitting secured creditors to credit bid does not
harm the bankruptcy estate unless there is a viable bidder willing to pay
more than the value of the secured claim and the credit bid somehow deters
this higher bid. A common way this occurs is by chilling the bidding and
discouraging realistic buyers from participating in an auction. For
example, a prospective bidder may conduct a cursory valuation and decide
that the assets are worth more than the potential credit bid, in which case he
is left in a position of needing to bid more than the credit bid after fronting
resources for due diligence, often all on a truncated timetable. Thus, as a
result of a secured creditor’s right to credit bid, a prospective bidder may
realistically elect to not participate in the auction.

34. Buccola & Keller, supra note 20, at 104.
35. Academics argue that economic theory shows that debtors can suffer price discounts in
bankruptcy sales due to prospective buyers’ fears of lacking undisclosed information about the financial
condition of the seller. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. OF ECON. 488 (1970).
36. BERSTEIN, supra note 5, at 2.

5/12/2016

Winter 2016

“FOR CAUSE” CREDIT BIDDING

249

C. RECENT TRENDS IN CREDIT BIDDING
Although secured creditors traditionally have taken credit bidding as a
given right, recent case law puts that assumption in question.37 In the past,
clever parties took advantage of their practically infallible credit bidding
rights by acquiring secured claims, wielding a credit bid, and negotiating
for a discounted asset sale or equity in the reorganized debtor.
Two trends created this opportunity.38 First, a significant increase in
second- and third-lien financing has created several echelons of secured
debt on the balance sheet of many companies.39 For example, by one
measure, the total value of second-lien loans increased from roughly $430
million in 2002 to $17.6 billion in 2005.40 Second, a large magnitude of
nontraditional lenders emerged in recent years.41 These lenders include
private equity funds, hedge funds, and other distressed debt investment
funds that have higher tolerances for debts of financially distressed
companies.42 Significantly, these higher risk tolerances enable the lenders
to engage in “loan to own” strategies wherein they enter into a loan
agreement with an eye towards taking control of the borrower.43
These trends have created an environment where investors are more
likely to purchase the secured debt of financially distressed companies,
strategically wield their credit bid, and eventually bid on their collateral in
bankruptcy auctions. Because Bankruptcy Code section 363(k) empowers
the court to restrict a secured creditor’s ability to credit bid “for cause,”
bankruptcy courts will likely continue to come up against challenges to
credit bids.
D. CREDIT BIDDING UNDER PRE-CODE STATE LAW
Although credit bidding is hotly contested within bankruptcy
proceedings, the right to credit bid in foreclosure proceedings is wellrecognized under applicable nonbankruptcy law.44 Although much of the
37. See generally Fisker, 510 B.R. at 55.
38. See Daniel P. Winikka & Debra K. Simpson, Will Bankruptcy Courts Limit the Right to Credit
Bid?, 17 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 6, Art. 6 (2008).
39. Id.
40. Rob Graver, The Benefits of Second Lien Loans, CAPITALEYES (BANK OF AMERICA),
(Nov./Dec. 2006), available online at: http://corp.bankofamerica.com/public/public.portal?_pd_page_
label=products/abf/capeyes/archive_index&dcCapEyes=indCE&id=339.
41. Winikka & Simpson, supra note 38.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Broadmoor Realty, Inc. v. First Nationwide Bank, 568 So.2d 779, 781 (Ala. 1990)
(“The underlying purpose of a foreclosure sale is to sell property at public outcry in order to generate
funds to pay the affected creditors. . . . To require [a] ‘cash bid’ here would be to elevate form over
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pertinent case law does not directly touch on credit bidding, these cases
generally presuppose that creditors possess the right to credit bid.45
The most significant nonbankruptcy law case on the topic is Louisville
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford.46 Here, Justice Brandeis struck down
section 75 of the First Frazier-Lemke Act, holding that it took “from the
Bank [mortgagee] without compensation, and given to Radford, rights in
specific property which are of substantial value . . . without just
compensation,” which violated the Fifth Amendment.47 In his opinion,
Justice Brandeis considered the foundation of secured creditors’ right to bid
for their collateral in bankruptcy auctions.48 He explained how the
conceptual understanding of a “mortgage” in U.S. law developed from a
“conditional conveyance theory,” under which defaulting borrowers
automatically forfeited their property to the creditor under strict
foreclosure, to a “lien theory,” under which the mortgagor was entitled to
the protection of a public sale.49
Justice Brandeis concluded that a mortgagee’s right to bid at the
trustee’s auction and subsequently seize the collateral amounted to an
indispensable property right.50 The effect of this holding was to categorize
the state law right of a secured creditor to bid at a foreclosure sale as a
property right, which may entitle it to constitutional protection.51 The
continued validity of this decision is the subject of some debate.52
Although the Louisville Joint Stock opinion does not directly discuss credit
bidding, the logic behind Justice Brandeis’ opinion — that in lieu of seizing
the collateral the mortgagee has a property right to bid at a foreclosure sale
— embraced a state law right to credit bid on par with the right to make a
cash bid.
Although the Bankruptcy Act did not include a provision specifically
governing credit bidding, it did recognize secured creditors’ right to credit

substance.”).
45. See e.g., Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell, 900 P.2d 601, 616 (Cal. 1995) (concluding that
the secured creditor’s “full credit bid” did not preclude (as a matter of law) its fraud claims against
certain defendants); Mogilka v. Jeka, 389 N.W.2d 359, 364 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that under a
plain reading of the statute at issue, junior lienholders who purchase an asset at foreclosure may only
credit their lien against the purchase price after senior lienholders have been paid in full).
46. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
47. Id. at 601–02.
48. Id. at 578–79.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 601–02.
51. Id. at 594.
52. See James Steven Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors’ Rights in Reorganization: A
Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV.
973 (1983).
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bid. This was primarily illustrated by a handful of court decisions under
the Act assuming that secured creditors possessed the right to credit bid.53
E. CREDIT BIDDING UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
1. Section 363 Sales
Debtors who wish to limit credit bidding in a sale of their assets may
utilize one of two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code: section 363 and
section 1129. Recently, debtors have progressively elected to use section
363 of the Code to carry out asset sales within Chapter 11.54
Section 363(b) empowers a trustee, or more frequently a debtor-inpossession, to “use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of
business, property of the estate.”55 This provision permits the debtor to sell
its assets free and clear of encumbrances.56 Typically, a debtor will file a
Chapter 11 petition, avail itself of the Code provisions that can protect it,
and then sell its assets through an auction under section 363.
However, section 363 also ensures that the interests of secured
creditors are preserved in “free and clear” sales. For example, section
363(e) affords secured creditors the right to adequate protection of their
interest,57 which typically means that the secured creditors’ liens attach to
the proceeds of the sale. Secured creditors also invoke section 363(k),58
which generally assures the right to credit bid, unless the court orders
otherwise “for cause.” When valuing collateral, courts predominantly
favor holding public auctions and construe section 363 to permit secured
creditors to credit bid the whole face value of their claims.59
2. Sales Pursuant to a Debtor’s Chapter 11 Plan
In the past, debtors had a viable avenue to avoid credit bids through
section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Code. The requirements of section 363 did
not necessarily apply to plans of reorganization under section 1129 and
debtors would try to convince judges to approve their plans that prohibited
53. See, e.g., In re Renne, 55 F. Supp. 868, 871–72 (D. Neb. 1944); Hous. Inv. Corp. v. Todman,
15 V.I. 300, 302 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 1978).
54. See e.g., Contrarian Funds LLC v. Aretex LLC (In re Westpoint Stevens, Inc.), 600 F.3d 231,
236–37 (2d Cir. 2010); Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d
448, 453 (3d Cir. 2006); United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 211 v. Family Snacks, Inc.
(In re Family Snacks, Inc.), 257 B.R. 884, 887 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2010).
56. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2010).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2010).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2010).
59. See, e.g., Cohen, 432 F.3d at 459.
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credit bidding.60 However, the Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel,
LLC v. Amalgamated Bank61 ended this practice.
If a debtor seeks to conduct a sale pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan
without the approval of secured creditors, the debtor must convince the
court that the plan is “fair and equitable” in its treatment of dissenting
classes.62 Section 1129(b)(2)(A) describes the three options debtors have
when attempting to meet the “fair and equitable” test. First, and most
commonly utilized, whoever holds the secured claims may keep their liens
on collateral in place and receive deferred payments equal to the present
value of their collateral.63 Second, the debtor must sell the collateral free
and clear of any liens, with the liens attaching to the proceeds of any sale.64
Under this second scheme, the secured creditor must be permitted to credit
bid. Finally, the plan of reorganization must ensure that the secured
creditors receive the “indubitable equivalent” of their secured claims.65
This ambiguous term has generally come to mean the value that the secured
creditor was contractually assured of receiving. Proceedings typically
become controversial when plan proponents attempt to “cramdown” a plan
that includes an auction, but bans credit bidding.66
3. Restricting Credit Bidding “For Cause” Under Section 363(k)
Despite the Code’s grant of entitlement, secured creditors’ right to
credit bid is not absolute. The Code acknowledges that secured creditors
with liens on assets that the debtor is trying to sell may credit bid for such
assets up to the value of the obligation “unless the court for cause orders
otherwise.”67 This judicial power applies both to sales outside of a Chapter
11 plan of reorganization and pursuant to a cramdown plan. Section 363(k)
of the Code provides:
At a sale under subsection (b) of this section of property that is
subject to a lien that secures an allowed claim, unless the court
for cause orders otherwise the holder of such claim may bid at
such sale, and, if the holder of such claim purchases such

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Buccola & Keller, supra note 20, at 107.
RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012).
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2010).
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (2010).
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2010).
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2010).
Buccola & Keller, supra note 20, at 108.
11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2010).
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property, such holder may offset such claim against the purchase
price of such property.68
Junior creditors and competing bidders often utilize this provision to
challenge the secured creditors’ right to credit bid. Specifically, they argue
that permitting the secured creditor to credit bid, especially on a protracted
timeline, will discourage other prospective bidders from investing the
resources necessary to conduct due diligence, thereby inhibiting the estate’s
ability to garner the highest price for the assets. Since RadLAX, these
arguments have gained traction.69
Courts’ use of the “for cause” exception is still rare, but it is possible
that in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in RadLAX, the
bankruptcy courts will increasingly construe this language expansively so
as to prevent holders of secured debt from reducing the value of bankruptcy
estates. In the few recent cases where courts have restricted credit bidding
“for cause,” the facts of the cases included at least one of a number of
commonalities. For example, courts limited credit bidding when there was
bad faith by the secured creditor or collusion with the debtor or trustee,70
when the secured creditor’s lien on the collateral was subject to a bona fide
dispute regarding its validity or priority,71 and when severe injustice to
other lienholders would have occurred.72
Even in the limited cases where a moratorium on credit bidding may
be appropriate, modern courts remain cautious of imposing blanket
prohibitions and instead opt for protective conditions on the credit bid.73
Still left unresolved is the issue of whether a party can establish cause
under section 363(k) to restrict credit bidding based only on the potential
injury it could have on the price gathered in the auction. Parties have
previously argued that credit bidding would chill the auction,74 but nobody

68. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2010) (emphasis added)
69. See Fisker, 510 B.R. at 57-60; Free-Lance Star, 512 B.R. at 805.
70. See, e.g., In re Aloha Airlines, Inc., No. 08-00337, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 4588, at 25–26 (Bankr.
D. Haw. 2009) (holding that cause existed under section 363(k) where the creditor was contractually
bound after the purchase of intellectual property to license it to a company that had allegedly
contributed to the failure of the debtor’s business).
71. In re Akard Street Fuels, L.P., 2001 WL 1568332 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2001) (holding that “a
bona fide dispute as to a creditor’s liens satisfies § 363(k)’s requirement of ‘for cause’ in disallowing a
secured creditor to credit bid at a sale”).
72. See, e.g., In re Takeout Taxi Holdings, Inc., 307 B.R. 525, 536 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004)
(reasoning that cause may be found to deny a secured creditor the right to credit bid if there are other
secured creditors with liens of equal priority, and there are no cash proceeds from the sale available for
distribution to them).
73. See, e.g., In re Octagon Roofing, 123 B.R. 583, 588 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (requiring the
credit bidding bank to deliver an irrevocable letter of credit to the trustee to secure the portion of the bid
based on a mortgage that was the subject of a pending adversary proceeding).
74. See In re Morgan House Gen. Pshp., 1997 WL 50419 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 1997).
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has yet attempted using that argument alone to establish cause. Although
“for cause” is still a largely undefined concept and has previously been
treated as a limited exception,75 it remains a strong weapon that debtors,
junior creditors, and prospective buyers wield to constrain credit bidding.
IV. RECENT DECISIONS IN THE CREDIT BIDDING ARENA
For many years, there were few, if any, noteworthy decisions that
examined secured creditors’ right to credit bid. Historically, credit bidding
was considered non-controversial. But, in 2009, a string of cases began
that created a circuit split. At issue in these cases was whether debtors in
Chapter 11 proceedings could restrict a secured creditor’s right to credit bid
in a cramdown. Ultimately, the Supreme Court settled the issue in RadLAX
Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank,76 in which it struck down
debtors’ ability to pass cramdown plans restricting secured creditors’ right
to credit bid.
At the time, the implications of the following decisions sent
shockwaves through the minds of bankruptcy practitioners and firms
investing in financially distressed companies.77 Long considered an
inviolable right upon which secured creditors relied, the ability to credit
bidding suddenly came into question.
A. RECENT CASES APPLYING § 1129(B)(2)
1. In re Pacific Lumber Company
In re Pacific Lumber was the first case to protect debtors’ ability to
restrict secured creditors’ right to credit bid through the use of cramdown.
Pacific Lumber concerned the two primary debtors in a group of six,
Pacific Lumber Company (“Palco”) and Scotia Pacific LLC (“Scopac”).
These two debtors grew, harvested, and processed timber under an
exclusive contract.78 After a year of lackluster progress toward a plan of
reorganization, the bankruptcy court terminated the debtors’ exclusivity
period and permitted the filing of five competing plans of reorganization.
The court only considered two of these plans for confirmation. The first

75. See In re Theroux, 169 B.R. 498 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1994); In re Diebart Bancroft, 1993 WL
21423 (E.D. La. 1993).
76. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 132 S. Ct. at 2073 (Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision).
77. Buccola & Keller, supra note 20, at 101.
78. In re Pacific Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 236 (5th Cir. 2009) (The appeal specifically
concerned two of the debtors: Pacific Lumber Company (Palco) and Scotia Pacific LLC (Scopac)).
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was proposed by the secured notes indenture trustee, which covered only
Scopac. The second plan was proposed by Marathon and MRC.79
After examination, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
Texas approved the Marathon/MRC plan,80 but disapproved the indenture
trustee’s plan.81 The Marathon/MRC plan dictated that the debtors’ assets,
including the “Timberlands” and assets of the sawmill would be conveyed
to two new entities, Townco and Newco.82
In order for the court to confirm the Marathon/MRC plan over the
dissent of the secured noteholders, the proponents needed to utilize the
cramdown provision of section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Code.83 As part of the
confirmation proceedings, the court heard testimony on the valuation of the
debtors’ assets. It concluded that the Timberlands were valued at “not
more than $510 million”84 and, therefore, $510 million was the
“indubitable equivalent”85 of the noteholders’ secured note claim. This
$510 million figure was far less than the value of the noteholders’ original
claim, which totaled approximately $740 million.86 Primarily due to this
disparity in valuation, the indenture trustee and several secured noteholders
moved for a stay of confirmation of the plan pending appeal.87 The court
denied their motion and the appeal was certified directly to the Fifth
Circuit.88
On appeal in front of a Fifth Circuit panel, the indenture trustee and
secured noteholders argued that the Timberlands were sold without
providing the secured noteholders an opportunity to credit bid and
therefore, under section 1129(b)(1) of the Code, the plan was not “fair and
equitable.”89 However, in a feat of statutory interpretation, the Fifth Circuit
disagreed with the indenture trustee and secured noteholders. Rather, the
court reasoned that “[t]he non-exhaustive nature of the three subsections is
inconsistent with treating them as compartmentalized alternatives.”90 In
other words, section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) does not apply to the exclusion of
sections 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) and (iii). On the contrary, section 1129(b)(2)(A)
should be read disjunctively and understood to guarantee secured creditors
the right to credit bid only where subsection 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) is the only
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Pacific Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 237.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 238.
Pacific Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 238.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(a)(iii) (2012).
Pacific Lumber, 584 F.3d at 237.
Id. at 239.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 245–46.
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applicable provision of section 1129(b)(2)(A). The court emphasized that,
with respect to whether the plan furnished the secured noteholders with the
“indubitable equivalent” of their claims, section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii)
referenced “such claims,” which meant that under section 506 of the Code,
the noteholders’ “allowed secured claims” should be considered.91
The secured noteholders continued to protest the claim, arguing that
by denying them the right to credit bid and foreclose on the Timberlands,
the plan “failed to afford them the indubitable equivalent because they
forfeited the possibility of later increases in the collateral’s value.”92 In
response, the Fifth Circuit underscored that the Bankruptcy Code “does not
protect a secured creditor’s upside potential; it protects the ‘allowed
secured claim.’”93 The court also indicated that the valuation process it
conducted ensured that the plan, “insofar as it paid the noteholders the
allowed amount of their secured claim, did not violate the absolute priority
rule.”94 A mild surprise was that the court’s decision did not address the
policy contradiction between section 1111(b) of the Code, which Congress
designed to protect secured creditors against judicial undervaluation of
their collateral, and the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that secured creditors’
“upside potential” is not protected by the Bankruptcy Code.95
2. In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC
Soon after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re Pacific Lumber, the
Third Circuit followed suit in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, affirming a
district court ruling that approved bid procedures restricting secured
creditors’ right to credit bid at an auction of the debtor’s assets.96
However, this decision was not without criticism. Judge Thomas L. Ambro
wrote a notable dissent to the majority’s decision.97 His primary contention
was that the majority’s decision would upset “three decades of secured
creditors’ expectations, thus increasing the cost of credit.”98
The plan proposed to the Bankruptcy Court in Philadelphia
Newspapers provided that substantially all of the debtor’s assets would be
sold at a public auction, free and clear of liens.99 The substantial proceeds
91. Pacific Lumber, 584 F.3d at246.
92. Id. at 247.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 249.
95. See Jason S. Brookner, Pacific Lumber and Philadelphia Newspapers: The Eradication of a
Carefully Constructed Statutory Regime Through Misinterpretation of Section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 127, 152 (2011).
96. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 301 (3d Cir. 2010).
97. Id. at 319.
98. Id. at 338.
99. Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 301.
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of such sale would be used to pay expenses and be distributed to
creditors.100 Importantly, the debtors structured the reorganization plan to
block credit bidding by secured creditors.101 In addressing this issue, the
bankruptcy court applied the canon of statutory construction of lex
generalis, stating that specific laws prevail over general ones,102 to section
1129(b)(2)(A). The court reasoned that the disjunctive “or” phrasing of
section 1129(b)(2)(A) “operates to provide alternatives.”103 This is
consistent with the definition of “or” provided by the Bankruptcy Code,
which states that “or” is not exclusive.104 In support of its proposition, the
bankruptcy court cited In re Pacific Lumber for the proposition that
“because the three subsections of § 1129(b)(2)(A) are joined by the
disjunctive ‘or,’ they are alternatives.”105 Thus, the court reasoned, a
debtor may avail itself to either subsection (i), (ii), or (iii) and is free from
satisfying more than one subsection.106
On appeal, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
reversed the decision of the bankruptcy court, holding that section
1129(b)(2)(A) barred the lenders from credit bidding in the auction.107 In
analyzing the issue, the district court took a much more textualist approach
than the bankruptcy court.108 The district court looked to the Fifth Circuit’s
In re Pacific Lumber109 decision and reasoned that since the debtor’s plan
seemingly met the “indubitable equivalent” standard of section
1129(b)(2)(A)(iii), the plan’s denial of credit bidding was permitted.110
The Third Circuit predominantly agreed with the district court,
concluding that it “simply cannot look past the statutory text, which plainly
supports the conclusion that § 1129(b)(2)(A) does not require credit
bidding in plan sales of collateral free of liens.” Like its peer, the Third
Circuit availed its reasoning of the disjunctive nature of the word “or” in
100. Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 301–02 (noting “[u]nder the Plan, the purchase will generate
approximately $37 million in cash for the Lenders. Additionally, the Lenders will receive the Debtors’
Philadelphia headquarters which the Debtors have valued at $ 29.5 million, subject to a two-year rent
free lease for the entity that will operate the newspapers. The Lenders would receive any cash that is
generated by a higher bid at the public auction.”).
101. Id. at 302.
102. See Lex specialis-Principle, TRANS-LEX.ORG LAW RESEARCH, http://www.trans-lex.org/910
000 (last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
103. Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3 at 305.
104. 11 U.S.C. § 102(5) (2012).
105. Pacific Lumber, 584 F.3d at 245.
106. Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 305.
107. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 418 B.R. 548, 552 (E.D.Pa. 2009).
108. Id. at 566–67 (explaining “any alleged unscrupulous conduct engaged in the by the respective
parties . . . is irrelevant to the Court’s analysis. Rather, the discrete issue . . . is the correctness of the
Bankruptcy Court’s holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow the Debtors’ to deny the Senior
Lenders the right to credit bid under the text of the relevant statutory provisions.”).
109. Pacific Lumber, 584 F.3d at 229.
110. Phila. Newspapers, 418 B.R. at 566–67.
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section 1129(b)(2)(A) and its correlated definition in section 102(5).111 The
court concluded that “satisfaction of any of the three subsections is
sufficient to meet the fair and equitable test of § 1129(b)(2)(A).”112
While the majority’s holding controlled, Judge Ambro’s lengthy
dissent is certainly notable for its arguments against restricting credit
bidding. Citing Congress’ intent to protect secured creditors both in sales
of their collateral free of liens and from undervaluations of their secured
assets, Judge Ambro argued that section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) is “exclusively
applicable to the proposed plan sale in this case, and with it comes a
presumptive right to credit bid by the secured lenders.”113 Further, he noted
that under this scheme, the debtors are free to argue that credit bidding
should be restricted “for cause” under section 363(k) of the Code.114
Subsequent arguments against restricting credit bidding have cited Judge
Ambro’s dissent.115
3. River Road Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank
Anxious secured lenders received some reprieve when the Seventh
Circuit in In re River Road Hotel Partners116 parted with the Third and
Fifth Circuits and upheld secured creditors’ right to credit bid in connection
with a sale of their collateral in a bankruptcy auction. In River Road, the
reorganization plan dictated that the debtors would sell substantially all of
their assets, which were primarily hotel properties, and that no credit
bidding would be permitted.117
Soon after the plan was filed, the secured lenders filed an objection,
arguing that the debtor’s plan could not satisfy section 1129(b)(2)(A)’s
requirements because it “sought to sell encumbered assets free and clear of
liens without allowing the lenders to bid their credit at the asset auctions, in
violation of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii)’s requirement that secured
creditors be given credit-bidding rights.”118 The debtors responded that in
fact the plan was confirmable because it satisfied the “indubitable
equivalent” standard of section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).119 However, the
Bankruptcy Court ruled in favor of the secured creditors, holding that the

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 319.
Id.
Id. at 338.
Id.
See River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642, 653 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 643.
Id. at 645.
Id.
Id.
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debtors’ plan could not be confirmed under section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).120
The debtors filed notices of appeal and both their appeals were certified
directly to the Seventh Circuit.121
On appeal, the debtors unwaveringly focused on the plain language of
section 1129(b)(2)(A). They argued that this language does not give courts
discretion; instead, they are compelled to approve any cramdown plan that
satisfies
section
1129(b)(2)(A)(iii)’s
“indubitable
equivalent”
requirement.122
Further, they contend that the statute’s language
“unambiguously indicates that a plan that provides a secured creditor with
the proceeds from the sale of an asset at an auction that does not permit
credit bidding satisfies the indubitable equivalence requirement.”123
Unsympathetic to the debtors’ pleas, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
decision of the bankruptcy court, holding that “the Code requires that
cramdown plans that contemplate selling encumbered assets free and clear
of liens at an auction satisfy the requirements set forth in Subsection (ii) of
the statute.”124 The court reasoned that canons of statutory construction
dictate that it should interpret section 1129(b)(2)(A) in a way to give
meaning to every part of the statute.125 On that logic, permitting a plan of
reorganization to sell encumbered assets as described in section
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) without meeting the requirements of that subsection
would make subsection (ii) superfluous. The court reasoned that the much
more plausible interpretation of section 1129(b)(2)(A) “would read each
subsection as stating the requirements for a particular type of sale” with
each subsection “conclusively governing” the event it regulates.126
In taking up the debtors’ second argument, the Seventh Circuit
rejected the idea that a plan providing the secured creditors with the
proceeds of a sale of their collateral but not permitting them to credit bid
automatically fulfills the “indubitable equivalence” standard.127 The court
indicated that auctions restricting credit bidding run the risk of
undervaluation, which creates a further risk that “the winning bids in these
auctions would not provide the Lenders with the current market value of
the encumbered assets.”128 In this way, the Seventh Circuit departed from
In re Pacific Lumber and In re Philadelphia Newspapers, in which the
circuit courts did not address the issue of whether the proposed treatment of
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

River Rd. Hotel Partners, 651 F.3d at 645.
Id.
Id. at 649.
Id.
Id. at 653.
Id. at 651 (citing TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)).
Id. at 652.
River Rd. Hotel Partners, 651 F.3d at 650–51.
Id. at 651.
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secured creditors under the reorganization plan would have satisfied the
indubitable equivalence standard.
The Seventh Circuit rounded out its reasoning by taking a holistic
look at the Bankruptcy Code. The court reasoned, “the Code has an
expressed interest in insuring that secured creditors are properly
compensated.”129 Further, the court took up Justice Ambro’s reasoning in
his In re Philadelphia Newspapers dissent, concluding that the Code does
not contain any provisions that authorize a public auction where credit
bidding is banned as a “legitimate way to dispose of encumbered assets.”130
Under the debtors’ plan, secured creditors would not be provided the same
types of protections enjoyed under other parts of the Code. Thus, the
debtors’ interpretation of section 1129(b)(2)(A) is “less plausible than a
construction of the statute that reads Subsection (ii), which offers the
standard protections to creditors, as providing the only way for plans
seeking to sell encumbered assets free and clear of liens to obtain ‘fair and
equitable’ status.”131 The logical corollary is that section 1129(b)(2)(A)
should instead be read to provide secured creditors with the standard
protections found elsewhere in the Code. The Seventh Circuit ultimately
held that the Code requires that the debtors’ reorganization plan provide
secured
creditors
the
protections
afforded
under
section
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).132
4. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, et al. v. Amalgamated Bank
On December 12, 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review In re River Road Hotel Partners and resolve the circuit split
between the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits. Ultimately, the Supreme
Court unanimously held on narrow statutory grounds that under section
1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, secured creditors may not be
denied the right to credit bid at a sale of their collateral pursuant to a
Chapter 11 plan.133 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, concluded that a
cramdown plan that endeavors to hold a sale of collateral free and clear of
encumbrances must satisfy the requirements set forth in section
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), and cannot be confirmed if it only satisfies the
“indubitable equivalent” standard of section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).134
Consequentially, debtors seeking to provide secured creditors with the

129.
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131.
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River Rd. Hotel Partners, 651 F.3d at 653.
Id.
Id. (quoting Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 331 (Ambro, J., dissenting)).
Id.
RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 132 S. Ct. at 2073.
Id. at 2072.
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“indubitable equivalent” of their secured claims must also allow secured
creditors to credit bid in a sale of their collateral.
The circuit court decisions in Pacific Lumber and Philadelphia
Newspapers, which suggested that secured creditors may be barred from
credit bidding in a sale of their collateral pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan,
were the subject of much dispute among commentators. Indeed, many
bankruptcy lawyers and commentators advocated for the Seventh Circuit’s
view as presented in River Road, under which a reorganization plan
involving the sale of collateral cannot be confirmed unless secured
creditors are afforded the right to credit bid in the asset sale.135
The Court’s analysis of the Bankruptcy Code’s section 1129(b)(2)(A)
focused predominantly on principles of statutory construction. The Court
turned to the canon of statutory construction that “the specific governs the
general” to dismiss the debtors’ reading of section 1129(b)(2)(A) as
“hyperliteral and contrary to common sense.”136 In the eyes of the Court,
subsection (ii) was a specific provision setting forth the prerequisites for
selling collateral free of liens, while subsection (iii) contained broadly
constructed language that does not refer to a sale of collateral.137 Under the
lens of this general/specific canon of statutory interpretation, the general
language of subsection (iii) does not apply where the sale is specifically
addressed by subsection (ii).138
In response to the debtors’ principle textual argument that section
1129(b)(2)(A) “unambiguously provides three distinct options for
confirming a Chapter 11 plan over the objection of a secured creditor,”139
the Court asserted that “[t]he question here, is not whether debtors must
comply with more than one clause, but rather which one of the three they
must satisfy.”140 The debtors went on to argue that “clause (ii) is no more
specific than clause (iii), because the former provides a procedural
protection to secured creditors (credit-bidding) while the latter provides a
substantive protection (indubitable equivalence).”141 As a result, the
debtors argue, subsection (ii) is not “a limiting subset” of subsection (iii),
which the general/specific canon requires.142 The Court responded to this
argument by stating that it knew of no authority supporting the idea that the

135. DONALD S. BERNSTEIN ET AL., Credit Bidding in Chapter 11 after RadLAX, in LAWRENCE P.
KING AND CHARLES SELIGSON WORKSHOP ON BANKRUPTCY AND BUSINESS REORGANIZATION 2012,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2243669.
136. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 132 S. Ct. at 2068.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Brief for Petitioners at 15, RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 132 S. Ct. at 2065 (No. 11-166).
140. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 132 S. Ct. at 2072.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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canon “is confined to situations in which the entirety of the specific
provision is a ‘subset’ of the general one.”143
In any case, the Court concluded that subsection (ii) is entirely a
subset of subsection (iii). Subsection (iii) applies to all cramdown plans,
which includes all situations that the narrower subsection (ii) applies.144
The Court observed that the scope, not the “nature of the provisions’
prescriptions,” is consequential when applying the general/specific
canon.145
Bearing in mind that its narrow statutory interpretation may not
always be absolute, the Court pointed out that “the general/specific canon
is not an absolute rule, but is merely a strong indication of statutory
meaning that can be overcome by textual indications that point in the other
direction.”146 It followed this tempering by noting that the present debtors
“point to no such indication here.”147 The Court provided an example of
this situation, which is a “statutory scheme in which the specific provision
embraced within a general one is not superfluous, because it creates a socalled safe harbor.” The Court rejected the debtors’ assertion that this was
the case here; that “clause (iii) (‘indubitable equivalent’) being the general
rule, and clauses (i) and (ii) setting forth procedures that will always, ipso
facto, establish an “indubitable equivalent,” with no need for judicial
evaluation.”148
B. EXPANDING THE SECTION 363(K) “FOR CAUSE” EXCEPTION
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s momentous RadLAX decision,
secured lenders are well advised to be mindful of section 363(k)’s power to
restrict credit bidding.149 Traditionally, courts have rarely utilized the “for
cause” exception borne out in section 363(k), generally only invoking it
when there was a bona fide dispute over the extent or validity of a secured
claim150 or some sort of misconduct by a creditor.151 Since RadLAX,
however, bankruptcy courts have shown more willingness to resort to

143. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 132 S. Ct. at 2072.
144. Id. at 2072–73.
145. Id. at 2073.
146. RadLax Gateway Hotel, 132 S. Ct. at 2072.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (1984) (restricting credit bidding “for cause”).
150. See, e.g., In re L.L. Murphrey, No. 12-03837-8-JRL, 2013 WL 2451368 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. June
6, 2013) (limiting the right to credit bid because of a dispute over the validity of liens).
151. See, e.g., In re Aloha Airlines, Case No. 08-00337, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 4588 (Bankr. D. Haw.
May 14, 2009) (restricting a secured creditor’s right to credit bid as a consequence of misconduct,
which included selling confidential information to a competitor).

5/12/2016

Winter 2016

“FOR CAUSE” CREDIT BIDDING

263

section 363(k) to constrain credit bidding.152 In In re Fisker Automotive
Holdings, Inc.153 and In re Free Lance-Star Publishing Company,154 two
different bankruptcy courts suggested that merely furthering bankruptcy
goals, such as enhancing the competition of an auction, could amount to a
“cause” sufficient to restrict credit bidding.
1. In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc.
In In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., Judge Kevin Gross of the
prominent United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware
provided some guidance as to the meaning of “for cause” in the context of
section 363(k). Fisker Automotive (“Fisker”) was founded in 2007. Its
primary business was the design and production of hybrid electric cars.155
Three years later, Fisker received a loan from the United States Department
of Energy to assist it in development and production of its products.156
Fisker faced challenges that prevented it from operating as planned
including safety recalls, loss of substantial inventory in Hurricane Sandy,
and the loss of their Department of Energy lending facility.157
On October 11, 2013, Hybrid Tech Holdings, LLC (“Hybrid”)
purchased Fisker’s outstanding loan facility debt due to the Department of
Energy.158 Although this debt totaled $168.5 million, Hybrid purchased it
at the auction for $25 million, which equates to roughly fifteen cents on the
dollar.159 Fisker eventually filed for Chapter 11 relief and originally
attempted to sell its assets to Hybrid through an asset purchase agreement
under which Hybrid would acquire “substantially all of the assets of
Debtors for consideration which includes $75 million in the form of a
credit bid” of the debt purchased from the Department of Energy.160
The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors preferred an auction
to a private sale and thus opposed Fisker’s yet-to-be consummated deal
with Hybrid.161 Specifically, the creditors endeavored to restrict Hybrid’s
ability to credit bid the debt it purchased from the Department of Energy.162
Instead, the creditors proposed an auction with Wanxiang America
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Corporation (“Wanxiang”).163 Wanxiang was a particularly attractive
buyer because it had recently purchased at an auction assets of bankrupt
A123 Systems, LLC for almost $300 million.164 Included in these assets
was the lithium ion battery, which was the primary component of Fisker’s
hybrid electric cars.165 Thus, Wanxiang had skin in the game. However,
Wanxiang recognized the power of Hybrid’s credit bid and refused to
participate in an auction unless Hybrid’s ability to credit bid was restricted
to $25 million.166
At a hearing on January 10, 2014, Fisker and its unsecured creditors
announced to the court that they agreed to narrow the scope of the dispute.
Both parties stipulated that (1) restricting Hybrid’s right to credit bid would
likely generate an auction with a material chance of creating significant
value for the estate in an amount greater than Hybrid’s present credit bid;167
(2) if Hybrid’s credit bid is not regulated, there is no realistic chance of an
auction;168 (3) restricting Hybrid’s ability to credit bid “would likely foster
and facilitate a competitive bidding environment”;169 and, lastly, (4) the
assets offered for sale include properly perfected collateral, assets not
subject to properly perfected liens in Hybrid’s favor, and assets where there
is “no dispute as to whether Hybrid has a properly perfected lien.”170
The question for the court was first whether Hybrid is entitled to a
credit bid and, if so, could the court limit Hybrid’s ability to credit bid.171
It was clear that if the answer to the second question was no, there would
be no auction and Hybrid would acquire Fisker’s assets at bargain prices,
leaving little for the creditors.172 The court immediately acknowledged
secured creditors’ longstanding right to credit bid, citing Bankruptcy Code
section 363(k), RadLAX, and Philadelphia Newspapers.173 However, the
court promptly noted that “[t]he law is equally clear . . . that the Court may
‘for cause order otherwise.’”174
In an initial effort to determine what “cause” means for purposes of
restricting credit bidding, the court engaged the Third Circuit’s ruling in In
re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC.175 In the referenced block of the Third
163.
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Circuit’s opinion, the court noted that “[i]n a variety of cases where a
debtor seeks to sell assets pursuant to § 363(b), courts have denied secured
lenders the right to bid their credit.”176 Subsequently, in a footnote, the
Third Circuit did away with the creditors’ argument that the court’s ability
to restrict credit bidding “for cause” is limited to situations in which a
“secured creditor has engaged in inequitable conduct.”177
Rather,
according to the court, “[a] court may deny a lender the right to credit bid
in the interest of any policy advanced by the Code, such as to ensure the
success of the reorganization or to foster a competitive bidding
environment.”178
The court’s first rub was with the debtors’ truncated timeline and
uncompromising attitude.179 The debtors filed these cases on November
22, 2013, which was three days before Thanksgiving.180 They then insisted
that the sale motion and confirmation hearings occur no later than January
3, 2014, two days after New Years Day.181 This timeline only provided
parties twenty-four days to challenge the sale motion, and less time for the
committee of unsecured creditors, which was not appointed until December
5, 2013.182 When the court prompted the debtors and Hybrid for
justifications for such a contracted timeline, neither presented a satisfactory
reason.183 In the end, the court focused on the third parties harmed by the
downfall of Fisker, concluding that “[i]t is the Court’s view that Hybrid’s
rush to purchase and to persist in such effort is inconsistent with the notions
of fairness in the bankruptcy process.”184
Next, the bankruptcy court took up the credit bid’s tendency to chill
bidding in the bankruptcy auction. The court reasoned that according to the
stipulations set forth by both parties, there would be no bidding whatsoever
if the court did not restrict Hybrid’s ability to credit bid.185 The court
recognized that Wanxiang was a highly attractive prospective buyer,
already having purchased assets consisting of the primary component of
Fisker’s electric cars.186 Stressing that the parties’ stipulations posited that
there would be no bidding, rather than just chilled bidding, the court
concluded that “the ‘for cause’ basis upon which the Court is limiting
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Hybrid’s credit bid is that bidding will not only be chilled without the cap;
bidding will be frozen.”187
Further drawing on the parties’ stipulations, the court addressed the
unsecured creditors’ argument that the amount of Hybrid’s secured claim is
uncertain. Hybrid cited In re Submicron Systems Corp.,188 arguing that
case law in the Third Circuit entitled it to credit bid its entire claim.
However, the bankruptcy court distinguished the present case from
Submicron Systems by reasoning that in the present case, it is the validity of
the lien that is in dispute, not the value of the lien.189 The court thus
justified limiting Hybrid’s ability to credit bid a claim secured by a lien of
an undetermined amount, concluding that no party knew what portion of
Hybrid’s claim would eventually be recognized as a secured claim.190
Based on the above reasoning, the court allowed Hybrid to credit bid.
But, it limited the extent to which Hybrid could do so to the $25 million it
paid for the distressed debt. Of note, the court did not explain why it
selected the $25 million figure as the amount of the restriction. Hybrid
immediately sought emergency leave to appeal to both the district court and
directly to the Third Circuit. The district court denied both requests.191
After the Bankruptcy Court limited Hybrid’s ability to credit bid, a
competitive auction between Wanxiang and Hybrid ensued. In the end,
Wanxiang was awarded the assets for a bid of $149.2 million.192 Here, the
ultimate sale price far exceeded the amount the estate would have received
had the court not restricted Hybrid’s ability to credit bid.
Fisker provides initial clarity as to what can constitute “cause” under
section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code. Although many distressed debt
investors are squirming nervously in their seats, Fisker far from set the
standard of how courts will interpret and employ section 363(k). The chief
takeaway in this regard is that although the court limited Hybrid’s ability to
credit bid, it is unclear why the court selected $25 million, which was the
price Hybrid paid for the distressed debt, as the appropriate ceiling. It is
possible that the court derived the $25 million figure from the parties’
stipulations, meaning it is unrelated to the purchase price of the debt.
187. Fisker, 510 B.R. at 60.
188. See Submicron Systems, 432 F.3d at 448.
189. Fisker, 510 B.R. at 61.
190. Id.
191. See Hybrid Tech Holdings, LLC v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Fisker Auto.
Holdings, Inc. (In re Fisker Auto Holdings, Inc.), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15497 (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2014);
Hybrid Tech Holdings, LLC v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Fisker Auto Holdings, Inc.
(In re Fisker Auto Holdings, Inc.), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17689, 1 (D. Del. Feb 12, 2014).
192. Ben Rosenblum, Delaware Court Finds “Cause” to Limit Credit-Bid to Facilitate
Bankruptcy Auction, JONES DAY PUBLICATION (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.jonesday.com/files/Public
ation/28c33426-1cfc-47e8-90d5-59d78a8a7d97/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/8513386c-a3da450b-9fab-e05aae1625a/Fisker%20Credit%20Bidding%20363_k_%20BRR%20Mar_Apr%202014.pdf.
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However, more likely is that the court sought to protect the interests of the
unsecured creditors and capping credit bidding at the purchase price was
comfortably justifiable on these grounds.
Regardless of why it chose the $25 million cap, the court’s focus was
squarely on whether it could restrict secured creditors’ ability to credit bid.
Judge Gross clearly answered that query in the affirmative. Given the
significant role that credit bidding plays in distressed acquisitions,
distressed debt purchasers are wise to study how subsequent courts
interpret and apply Fisker.
2. In re Free Lance-Star Publishing Company
A few months after Fisker was decided, a second court followed suit
in In re Free Lance-Star Publishing Company.193 The court largely
adopted Fisker’s reasoning in limiting the secured creditor’s ability to
credit bid.194 Here, Free Lance-Star Publishing Company entered Chapter
11 intending to sell substantially all of its assets in a section 363 sale.195
The debtor urged the court to limit the rights of its secured creditor, DSP
Acquisition, to credit bid.196 It asserted that cause existed under section
363(k) for three reasons.197 First, DSP did not have a lien on all of the
debtors’ property being sold.198 Second, the debtors allege that DSP
engaged in “inequitable conduct that has damped interest in the auction and
depressed the potential sales price the Debtors’ otherwise might have
realized from the sale of the business.”199 Lastly, the debtors asserted that
restricting DSP’s ability to credit bid would foster a competitive bidding
process by encouraging potential buyers to participate.200
Free Lance-Star’s first two reasons are consistent with historic
standards under which courts have limited secured creditors’ rights to
credit bid. However, with their third reason, that limiting the ability to
credit bid would foster a competitive bidding process, the debtors adopted
Fisker’s expansion of what constitutes “cause” for purposes of section
363(k).
In the end, the Bankruptcy Court limited DSP’s ability to credit bid. It
justified this restriction on a finding of a “perfect storm, requiring the
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curtailment of DSP’s credit bidding rights.”201 The contributors to this
perfect storm included “(i) DSP’s less than fully-secured lien status; (ii)
DSP’s overly zealous loan-to-own strategy; and (iii) the negative impact of
DSP’s misconduct.”202 Addressing DSP’s misconduct, the court cited the
pressure DSP exerted over the debtor to cultivate a “speedy bankruptcy
filing,” DSP’s strong objection to the debtor’s hiring of a financial
consultant, insistence that the marketing materials “contain on the front
page, in bold font, a statement that DSP had a right to a $39 million credit
bid,” and that DSP had unilaterally recorded financing statements in an
attempt to perfect a security interest in some of the debtors’ assets, which
DSP did not have a lien on.203
Although DSP engaged in inequitable conduct, the court did not
extinguish the entirety of its right to credit bid.204 Rather, the court
determined that “in order to foster a robust and competitive bidding
environment,” sufficient cause existed to limit DSP’s credit bid to a total of
$13.9 million.205 Hybrid filed an emergency motion seeking leave to
appeal the ruling, which the Delaware’s District Court denied.206
Like Fisker, it is not clear how Judge Huennekens arrived at that
figure. It is clear that he relied on Suzanne Roski, the debtors’ expert
witness from its financial consultant who testified regarding the proposed
bidding procedures and auction process.207 The court noted that “[t]he
methodology Roski employed eliminated the unencumbered assets of the
Debtors from the potential credit bid and applied a market analysis to
develop an appropriate cap for a credit bid that would foster a competitive
auction process.”208 Ultimately, DSP submitted the winning bid in the
auction, in which it paid a total of about $30 million — $16.3 million in
cash and a credit bid of $14 million.209
3. In re RML Development, Inc.
Soon after Free Lance-Star, the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Western District of Tennessee handed down a decision that
201. Free Lance-Star, 512 B.R. at 807.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 803.
204. Id. at 808.
205. Free Lance-Star, 512 B.R. at 808.
206. In re Fisker Auto. Holdings, Inc., No. 14-CV-99 (GMS), 2014 WL 576370, at *1 (D. Del. Feb.
12, 2014).
207. Free Lance-Star, 512 B.R. at 807.
208. Id.
209. See Maria Chutchian, Free Lance-Star Newspaper Co. Gets Go-Ahead For $30M Sale,
LAW360 (May 28, 2014, 6:26 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/542270/free-lance-star-newspaper
-co-gets-go-ahead-for-30m-sale.
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commentators argue cuts against the grain of Fisker and Free Lance-Star.
After careful study, however, these arguments appear misguided.
In In re RML Development, Inc.,210 the debtor sought to sell two
residential apartment complexes outside the ordinary course of business
under section 363. Subsequently, one of the creditors, SPCP Group III CNI
1, LLC (“Silverpoint”) asserted that it held a valid first mortgage interest in
both apartment complexes that the debtor sought to sell.211 It thus filed a
motion seeking permission to credit bid the full amount of its secured claim
at the bankruptcy auction.212 Silverpoint’s senior liens secured its
obligations in the amount of approximately $2.5 million.213
Unlike Fisker and Free Lance-Star, there were no allegations of
inequitable conduct on the part of the secured creditors. Rather, the debtor
admitted that Silverpoint’s claim totaled approximately $2.3 million and
only raised objections regarding the last $200,000.214 Ultimately, the court
permitted Silverpoint to credit bid up to the undisputed value of its claim
but required any bid over the $2.3 million figure to be bid in cash to be held
in escrow until RML’s objection to Silverpoint’s claim was resolved.215
The court noted that it should only restrict secured creditors’ ability to
credit bid “when equitable concerns give it cause.”216 It went on to
conclude, “such a modification or denial of credit bid rights should be the
extraordinary exception and not the norm.”217 This clearly worded
statement appears to suggest that “cause” under section 363(k) should be
narrowly construed, thus limiting judicial authority to restrict credit bids
and cutting against Fisker and Free Lance-Star. However, after further
analysis, this is not the case.
Consider that in RML there were no allegations of inequitable conduct
as there were in Fisker and Free Lance-Star. So, giving context to the
RML court’s statement that restricting credit bidding should be the
extraordinary exception rather than the norm, it is conceivable that this
statement was only intended to apply in similar situations where no
inequitable conduct was present. Viewed in this light, the statement was
intended as a guidepost for cases such as RML where no inequitable
conduct by a secured creditor was at issue.
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Even more telling is the fact that despite concluding that restricting
credit bids should be the extraordinary exception, the court did restrict
Silverpoint’s credit bidding rights to the value of its undisputed claim.218
Given its statement requiring an “extraordinary exception,” it is surprising
that the court appeared to base its limitation on the finding of a “bona fide
dispute” over whether the last $200,000 of Silverpoint’s claim is proper.219
For a court so favoring judicial restraint in this regard, Judge David
Kennedy implicitly set a low bar for limiting Silverpoint’s credit bid absent
inequitable conduct.
Yet, in a footnote the court pointed out, “where a creditor holds an
uncontested secured claim, it should ordinarily be permitted to bid . . .
regardless of its intrinsic impact on other bidding.”220 The court is clear
that “mere ‘chilling’ of third party bids” will not suffice as cause to limit
credit bidding rights.221 This point is potentially in conflict with the Fisker
and Free Lance-Star courts’ opinions, in which chilling of the bidding was
adjudged to have inhibited a competitive bidding process and thus
contributed to “cause” to limit credit bidding.
Thus, the extraordinary exception language used by the RML court
cuts slightly against prior decisions in some respects, but does not go as far
as it initially seems to. In similar cases where no inequitable conduct on
the part of secured creditors is alleged, RML seems to have set a low bar for
restricting secured creditors’ right to credit bid in an auction.
4. In re Charles Street African Methodist Episcopal Church
Most recently, in In re Charles Street African Methodist Episcopal
Church,222 a bankruptcy court denied in part a debtor’s motion to limit
credit bidding. In Charles Street, Charles Street African Methodist
Episcopal Church (“CSAME”) owned two contiguous parcels of real
property.223 CSAME moved to sell these parcels free and clear of liens to
its stalking horse bidder, Action for Boston Community Development, Inc.
(“ABCD”), or to the highest bidder at an auction.224
Pursuant to the plan, CSAME was obligated to pay ABCD a $50,000
break-up fee if ABCD was not ultimately the highest bidder.225 Two other
218.
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parties, Horizons for Homeless Children, Inc. and OneUnited showed
interest in bidding for the assets.226 However, the debtor’s motion also
included a request to prohibit OneUnited from credit bidding for the assets
or to at least require the non-stalking horse bidders to submit $210,000 in
cash to pay ABCD’s break-up fee.227 CSAME also filed an objection to
OneUnited’s claim.228 OneUnited’s claims were secured by CSAME’s real
property.229
Picking up on Judge Kennedy’s reasoning in RML, CSAME argued
that its objection showed that OneUnited’s claim is subject to a “bona fide”
dispute, which created sufficient cause to deny OneUnited’s right to credit
bid under section 363(k).230 The bankruptcy court acknowledged that often
“the existence of a bona fide dispute as to the secured claim is cause” to
restrict credit bidding.231
However, under these facts, CSAME’s
“counterclaims do not amount to cause to prohibit credit bidding.”232
The court explained that it arrived at this conclusion primarily because
CSAME’s objections do not challenge OneUnited’s underlying claims but
instead “interpose counterclaims as the basis of a defense of setoff.”233 It
went on to explain that “CSAME does not dispute the validity of the
underlying loan agreements, the validity, perfection, or priority of
OneUnited’s mortgages, the amounts claimed to be due, or anything
intrinsic to either of OneUnited’s claims.”234
The court also quickly disposed of an off-topic credit risk argument
posed by CSAME. CSAME’s argument, essentially, was that that if
OneUnited was permitted to credit bid freely, then the claim that would
satisfy CSAME’s counterclaim would already have, at least in part, been
used up.235 This effectively rendered any judgment that CSAME may
obtain on its counterclaims uncollectible.236 As a result, credit bidding
created an unjust credit risk.237 The court seemed to see through this veiled
attempt at securing prepayment. Reasoning that CSAME had bad
intentions in making this credit risk argument, the court concluded that
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CSAME had attempted to use “a denial of credit bidding as, in essence, a
form of prejudgment security.”238
Next, the court took up CSAME’s alternative request for narrowed
credit bidding rights. In other words, CSAME requested that any bid not
from the stalking-horse ABCD include a mandatory cash sum of $210,000
to pay for the break-up fee due to ABCD.239 As OneUnited did not oppose
this request, the court agreed that the “need to fund the break-up fee [was]
cause to limit the right to credit bid.”240 However, the court saw no need to
exceed the protection beyond the $50,000 break-up fee. So, the court
limited OneUnited’s right to credit bid only to the extent that in order to
participate in the auction, it must include $50,000 cash in its bid.241
It is unclear what role Charles Street plays in the ongoing chain of
credit bidding case law. CSAME expressly disavowed any reliance on
theories used to limit credit bidding in Fisker including bid chilling and
inequitable conduct by a secured creditor.242 Although the Charles Street
court had “no occasion to address Fisker’s rationale,” this case stands to
further define the boundaries of cause under section 363(k), specifically
that courts will dismiss frivolous attempts by debtors to establish cause.243
V. HAVE COURTS SET A NEW STANDARD FOR WHAT
CONSTITUTES SUFFICIENT CAUSE?
The natural question, and the one which this Note aims to address, is
whether courts have set a new standard for what constitutes cause sufficient
to limit secured creditors’ right to credit bid under section 363(k) of the
Bankruptcy Code. A sufficient answer to this question may only be
obtained through thorough analysis of the relevant case law after
RadLAX.244 In sum, my evaluation is as follows: section 363(k) of the
Code does not set parameters on what constitutes “cause” to limit the right
to credit bid. Legal scholars have made convincing arguments that Chapter
11 has become obsolescent in today’s legal climate.245 Gone are the days
where secured creditors need such robust protection.
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In today’s system, investors, namely hedge funds and private equity
firms, purchase outstanding obligations of distressed firms at steep
discounts with the intention of extracting substantial value in bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy courts must balance the interests of debtors while protecting
secured creditors’ from undervaluation of their collateral in a sale. The
RadLAX decision reduced the ability of bankruptcy courts to ensure these
equitable results in the current system by confirming that secured creditors
may not be denied the right to credit bid at a sale of their collateral pursuant
to a Chapter 11 plan under section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy
Code.246 The Court decided RadLAX on very narrow statutory grounds, not
discussing at length the equities associated with the current system of credit
bidding. It is plausible to read this restrained opinion as conferring to
bankruptcy judges the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether
credit bidding is fair and equitable and, if so, to what degree it should be
permitted in a given case.
In an effort to ensure equity since RadLAX, bankruptcy courts in
Fisker and its progeny have struggled to discern what constitutes “cause”
under section 363(k) of the Code. Whether section 363(k) will evolve into
an oft-used mechanism to ensure equity is unclear. What is clear is that
ambiguity abounds and we are likely to soon see appellate review and
potentially another Supreme Court review of credit bidding.
A. THE EFFECT OF FISKER AND FREE LANCE-STAR
The facts of Fisker exemplify the current climate of distressed debt
investors attempting to extract value in bankruptcy. Hybrid Tech Holdings,
LLC purchased Fisker’s outstanding loan facility debt due to the
Department of Energy at roughly fifteen cents on the dollar.247 Sensing
inequity and undue pressure from Hybrid, Judge Kevin Gross invoked
section 363(k) to limit Hybrid’s credit bidding ability.248 The reasons he
cited for such action expanded the conventional interpretation of section
363(k). For example, he cited the debtors’ truncated timeline and
uncompromising attitude, the complete freezing of bidding, and the
uncertainty of Hybrid’s claim amount. Fisker represented the first attempt
of bankruptcy judges to combat inequity and so called “loan-to-own”
strategies.
The reasoning in Fisker gained momentum when the court in Free
Lance-Star also invoked section 363(k) to limit the secured creditor’s right

246. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 132 S. Ct. at 2073.
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to credit bid.249 The Free Lance-Star court relied heavily on the concepts
originated in Fisker, even citing Fisker for the proposition that credit
bidding can be restricted in order to promote a competitive bidding
environment.250 Further, the court discussed at length what it considered
“inequitable” conduct by DSP, focusing on the negative impact of DSP’s
actions on the credit bid mechanism.251 Of note, however, is that Judge
Kevin Huennekens did not address whether other factors, such as a dispute
over the validity of the claim, were sufficient cause to limit credit
bidding.252
In both Fisker and Free Lance-Star, the secured creditors pursued
loan-to-own strategies and the courts found them to have engaged in
“inequitable conduct.” In Fisker, this meant trying to rush a private sale
and in Free Lance-Star, this meant trying to stretch its lien on the debtor’s
assets in bad faith. So, the question remains, how much weight does each
factor carry? Should investors purchasing secured debt of distressed firms
at discounted prices be concerned or will courts require more than just a
loan-to-own strategy to find cause sufficient to limit credit bidding rights?
Taken to its logical extreme, Fisker stands for the proposition that courts
may restrict credit bidding rights even without the presence of inequitable
conduct or a dispute as to the validity of a creditor’s lien or claim.
Unfortunately, any answers set forth at this point in time are merely
conjecture. Either uniformity in bankruptcy courts’ decisions or appellate
guidance is needed to settle the issue.
Even with the lack of decisive resolution, there are important
takeaways from both Fisker and Free Lance-Star. First, and most notably,
the holdings can be plausibly interpreted as bankruptcy courts’ reactions to
what they saw as inequitable loan-to-own strategies by influential investors
attempting to exert excessive control over debtors and extract substantial
value from the firm. With this in mind, investors who purchase secured
claims in distressed firms are well advised to be especially sensitive to how
the court perceives their role in the bankruptcy process. Specifically,
courts and committees of unsecured creditors will scrutinize investors’
influence on the debtor’s timeline and on the debtor’s ability to secure
financial advisors to aid it in obtaining the highest price in an auction.
Second, Fisker and Free Lance-Star will continue to be relied on by
parties in bankruptcy proceedings seeking to limit credit bidding rights.
This leverage may be tapered, however, by subsequent case law and by the
249. Free Lance-Star, 512 B.R. at 807.
250. Id. at 808.
251. Id. at 806.
252. It was undisputed that DSP’s loan was secured by a lien on some of Free Lance-Star’s real and
personal property, but not on the assets in question.
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relatively sizable discretion that bankruptcy judges wield. Those holding
secured claims will be wise to holistically evaluate the judge’s perception
of their position in light of Fisker and Free Lance-Star when negotiating
with debtors. With the apparent judicial hostility towards loan-to-own
strategies, secured claimholders must adapt to the negative impact that
surely will follow the uncertainty created by these cases.
B. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RML AND CHARLES STREET
RML and Charles Street add to the base built by Fisker and Free
Lance-Star. However, RML is distinguishable from both Fisker and Free
Lance-Star. In RML, there were no allegations or findings of inequitable
conduct by secured creditors. The RML court focused its analysis on this
principal of inequity, noting that credit bidding rights should only be
restricted “when equitable concerns give it cause” and that this event
should be the “extraordinary exception and not the norm.”253 It eventually
limited the contested portion of the claim, finding that a “bona fide” dispute
existed as to the extent of the claim.254
The RML decision potentially departs from Fisker and Free LanceStar regarding the weight of credit bidding’s “chilling” effect on auctions.
The RML court plainly holds that “mere ‘chilling’ of third party bids” will
not suffice as cause to limit credit bidding rights.255 In contrast, the Fisker
and Free Lance-Star courts included bid chilling in their justification for
limiting credit bidding. However, of note, the courts did not limit credit
bidding solely on the basis of bid chilling. In this regard, RML does not
directly conflict with Fisker and Free Lance-Star, but may indicate a
departure from their required level of evidence.
Unfortunately, the RML court left unclear whether its hostile attitude
toward limiting credit bidding rights should apply only under similar
situations or whether its logic was also intended to apply to situations in
which there was inequitable conduct. Regardless, the opinion is surely
influential in cases that do not include allegations or findings of inequitable
conduct.
The Charles Street reasoning sets forth a more traditional, pre-Fisker
case. There, the court refused to limit credit bidding except for a predetermined break-up fee agreed to with the stalking horse bidder. CSAME
attempted to take up the RML court’s logic by arguing that its objection
showed that the secured creditor’s claim is subject to a “bona fide” dispute,
253. RML Dev., 528 B.R. at 150.
254. In re RML Dev., Inc., 2 No. 13-29244, 2014 WL 3378578, at 12 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. July 10,
2014).
255. Id. at 14, n. 11.
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which created sufficient cause to deny the secured creditor’s right to credit
bid.256 In denying CSAME’s attempt to restrict the secured creditor’s
credit bid, the court observed that “CSAME does not dispute the validity of
the underlying loan agreements, the validity, perfection, or priority of
OneUnited’s mortgages, the amounts claimed to be due, or anything
intrinsic to either of OneUnited’s claims.”257 This suggests that the court
saw through CSAME’s veiled attempt to stifle credit bidding and,
upholding principles of equity, dismissed it as such.
The court in Charles Street expressly noted that it was not addressing
the “types of ‘cause’” at issue in Fisker. Thus, Charles Street stands to
support the proposition that although a dispute over the validity of a claim
or lien may constitute cause, veiled attempts to utilize counterclaims that
do not challenge the underlying claims as a defense to restrict credit
bidding will be struck down.
C. SO, WHERE DO WE STAND?
The question left open by Fisker and its progeny still is: How wide of
an interpretation will courts use in interpreting cause as sufficient grounds
to limit credit bidding? Under what circumstances will a court limit a
secured creditor’s right to credit bid? For example, could a mere showing
of a loan-to-own strategy that would depress the debtor’s ability to fetch
the highest price at an auction be sufficient?
No one has yet attempted to establish cause under section 363(k) by
showing that the secured claimant acquired the debt as part of a strategy to
acquire the firm or its assets. This, however, is a logical extension of the
case law. As long as it is profitable, secured creditors will continue to
make use of credit bidding as part of acquisition strategies. As a result,
bankruptcy courts will likely be asked to consider such contentions and set
firmer parameters defining what constitutes cause to restrict credit bidding.
If the judiciary continues to limit credit bidding for cause, purchasers
of secured claims of distressed companies may lose much of their incentive
for acquiring such debt. This alteration of claim purchasers’ incentive
structure will also impact secured creditors and debtors. Increased risk of
bankruptcy courts limiting credit bidding will drive down the price of
distressed companies’ outstanding claims. The extent to which secured
creditors may encounter difficulty selling debt that they own in distressed
companies is unclear. Should secured creditors experience increased
difficulty divesting their claims, debtors may gain leverage in negotiations
256. Charles St. African Methodist, 510 B.R. at 457.
257. Id. at 458.
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with secured creditors. As a result, secured creditors may face additional
pressure to negotiate with the debtor to restructure their debt. These
negative effects caused by judicial uncertainty shift the negotiating clout
surrounding the bankruptcy process and must be carefully examined.
There is no definitive indication that the judiciary intends to use
section 363(k) to reduce secured creditors’ ability to acquire debtors’ assets
at depressed prices or to influence the bankruptcy process by way of credit
bidding. Reduced secured creditor clout could increase values of
bankruptcy estates, which the judiciary holds as a fundamental goal of
bankruptcy law. If the courts intend to find a solution to the issues
surrounding credit bidding, they must resolve the uncertainty.
There is no consensus manner to remedy this issue to be found in the
dearth of academic literature surrounding credit bidding.258 However, what
these writings do agree on is that Fisker and its progeny could have serious
implications on future auctions and more generally on the market for
secured claims of distressed companies.259
Secured creditors seeking to avoid limitations of their ability to credit
bid must be aware of the perception they now carry and the potentially
associated tradeoffs. The days of pressuring debtors into a hasty,
conclusive sale and having unlimited credit bidding power may be over.
Instead, secured creditors must be prepared for a world in which judges
scrutinize interactions and encourage competitive auction processes
conducted on lenient timetables as the dominant method of selling the
assets of distressed firms in bankruptcy.
D. A PATH FORWARD
In the vast majority of cases, courts should permit secured creditors to
credit bid the full value of their secured claim. However, in limited
circumstances, courts may appropriately limit secured creditors’ right to
credit bit for cause under section 363(k) to the creditors’ basis in the
secured claim. Such limited circumstances include special situations in
which the bankruptcy court either reasonably seeks to avoid inequitable
conduct by secured creditors or must act to prevent unreasonable bid
chilling. This proposal aims to strike a balance between secured creditors’
258. However, the American Bankruptcy Institute recently published a book. PAUL R. HAGE ET AL.,
supra note 244.
259. See supra note 192; Kobi Kastiel, Two New Cases Cast a Shadow Over Credit Bidding, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (July 13, 2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.
edu/2014/07/13/two-new-cases-cast-a-shadow-over-credit-bidding/; Adam C. Harris et al., Credit Bid
Buyers Beware: Delaware Bankruptcy Court Caps Credit Bid, SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL LLP,
RESOURCES (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.srz.com/Credit_Bid_Buyers_ Beware_Delaware_Bankruptcy_
Court_Caps_Credit_Bid/.
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right to protect the value of their claim and bankruptcy law’s goal of
maximizing the value of debtors’ estates.
In the limited circumstances where courts appropriately cap credit
bidding, the secured creditors’ basis in his claim is an appropriate cap.
Two primary assertions underpin this principle. First, section 363 seeks to
avoid the difficulties and inefficiencies involved in judicial valuation of
collateral. Instead, courts prefer deferring to a free market sale to value
assets.260 Implicit in this notion is that a free market sale must be
referenced in order to avoid conducting a judicial valuation of collateral. In
the context of a secured creditor planning a credit bid, the most recent sale
prior to a bankruptcy auction is typically the acquisition of secured claims.
The price paid for these secured claims is thus the best representation of
value that courts have to reference.
Second, capping the right to credit bid at secured creditors’ basis in
the claim will, to a large extent, prevent bid chilling and inequitable
conduct. If outside market participants do not face a credit bid representing
claims exceeding the value of the collateral, they are more likely to invest
the time and money to conduct due diligence and potentially submit a bid.
Further, capping credit bidding at secured creditors’ basis reduces the clout
that secured creditors wield in negotiations. If a debtor believes that an
auction will yield a third party bid greater than the value of a secured
creditor’s basis in his claim, it will be less likely to agree to inequitable
arrangements with the secured creditor prior to the auction. This
mechanism allows debtors to avoid, for example, pressured sales to secured
creditors on contracted timelines.
When evaluating proposed credit bidding arrangements, courts’ focus
should be on equity. Thus, unusual circumstances where equity so
demands are appropriate situations in which to limit credit bidding.
Blanket prohibitions on secured creditors’ right to credit bid are improper.
Rather, courts may find limiting credit bids to the claimholder’s basis to be
a justifiable cap. This cap both protects bankruptcy estates from improper
bid chilling and inequitable conduct by secured creditors and assures
secured creditors the right to credit bid a reasonable amount of their claims.
To the extent that courts invoke section 363(k) to limit the right to
credit bid in order to avoid undue influence, they must draw a boundary
indicating a zone of permissible activities for secured creditors to operate
within. The legal field of lender liability provides guidance on this issue.
In In re Radnor Holdings Corp.,261 the court concluded that the overarching
inquiry in a recharacterization of debt to equity is the intent of the parties.
260. SubMicron Systems, 432 F.3d at 461.
261. In re Radnor Holdings Corp., 353 B.R. 820 (2006).

5/12/2016

Winter 2016

“FOR CAUSE” CREDIT BIDDING

279

Although I disagree with this conclusion, the court correctly emphasized
that no “mechanistic” approach would suffice and a “common sense
evaluation of the facts and circumstances surrounding a transaction” must
be applied.262 In the context of assessing undue influence by secured
creditors, this evaluation includes consideration of the bargaining positions
of each party, availability of outside options, control that the secured
creditor maintains over the day-to-day operations of the debtor, the secured
creditor’s control of the debtor’s board of directors, and the economic
reality of the surrounding circumstances. In limited circumstances, these
factors may suggest that a cap on credit bidding is appropriate.
VI. CONCLUSION
With secured creditors hugely profiting from acquisition strategies
utilizing credit bidding, they will expectedly continue to push the
boundaries of the law. As a result, bankruptcy courts will likely be
increasingly called upon to consider objections to bidding procedures.
While the traditional method of challenging the validity or priority of the
underlying claim will persist, use of the “for cause” exception embodied in
section 363(k) of the Code will continue to garner increased attention. The
arguments for what constitutes “cause” will expand and courts will likely
be compelled to set parameters. At this time, the extent to which courts
will limit credit biding “for cause” remains unclear. Whether or not courts
continue to expand the “for cause” exception in the long term, the current
climate of uncertainty will continue to produce negative effects in the
market for secured claims of distressed companies. As a result of the
negative externalities associated with such unfettered uncertainty, we are
likely to see forthcoming appellate guidance and potentially Supreme Court
review of the issue.

262. Radnor Holdings, 353 B.R.at 840.

